Rail Tunnel Fire Safety SaRS Asia Pacific webinar 15/09/2021

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


Mosen Ltd

- Engineering consultancy specialising in tunnel ventilation, fire safety and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
- Established in 2007
- Based in the UK, with representation in Australia
- Delivered designs and advice to many infrastructure projects world-wide



Geographic Scope





Regulatory & Legal Framework

- Presentation strongly influenced by legal framework in countries where Mosen Ltd has operated
- Comments will be made regarding other legal frameworks and regulatory requirements



Past fire incidents in rail tunnels



King's Cross Fire, UK, 1987

- Fire started under a wooden escalator serving the Piccadilly line
- Erupted in a flashover into the underground ticket hall (→"trench effect")
- Killed 31 people and injured 100
- Started by a lit match being dropped onto the escalator
- Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989 introduced
- Wooden escalators were gradually replaced with metal escalators on the London Underground





7 July 2005 London bombings

- Series of 4 coordinated suicide attacks – including 3 bombs on London Underground trains
- 52 killed and more than 700 injured
- Limited smoke production - trains smouldered, but did not burn





Hong Kong MTR Firebombing, 2017

- Firebomb attack (arson)
- Approach to Tsim Sha Tsui station
- 18 passengers injured, 4 critically
- Smoke inhalation and burns






Daegu Station, South Korea, 2003

- Arson attack
- 182 deaths
- Two subway trains destroyed
- Doors locked on second train



Kaprun, Austria, 2000

- Austrian Funicular Railway Tunnel
- 155 deaths
- 3.3 km tunnel
- Electrical fault?
- Strong chimney effect
- Doors failed to open



1 Tunnel Route Train trapped 600 metres inside tunnel Ski centre Emergency services attempted to enter the



Train pulled up

mountain by

ALPINE INFERNO

900m

Tunnel distance: 3200m

Capacity: 180 people Maximum gradient: 50%







2,400m

Train catches fire 600m into tunnel NOT TO SCALE

TUNNEL

ALPINE CENTRE

Channel Tunnel Fires

- 50 km long Channel Tunnel
- Opened in 1994
- Four fires on trucks being carried through the tunnel: 1996, 2006, 2008, 2015
- None fatal, but with some injuries due to smoke inhalation & damage to tunnel
- Four fire suppression stations constructed in 2011 (deployed in 2015 fire)



VUE GÉNÉRALE GENERAL VIEW FIGURE



L'Enfant Plaza Station, Washington DC, 2015

- Arcing from third rail
- 91 people were injured, and one passenger died
- Inadequate tunnel ventilation
- Railcar ventilation not shut down
- Emergency responders initially went to wrong tunnel
- Ineffective inspection and maintenance practices





Ang Mo Kio MRT Station, Singapore, 2015

- Electrical panel caught fire in a substation
- No injuries
- Train operations disrupted for over 2 hours






Safety Factors and Stakeholders



Safety Factors and Stakeholders





The Regulatory Cycle

Major fire incident

 Inadequate fire precautions (infrastructure, vehicles, equipment, operations)

 Industry / technology / market developments

- Previously unforeseen fire scenarios

New regulations, standards and guidelines



International and national standards for railway fire safety



Underground Railway Fire Safety Standards

- NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems → North America, Middle East and associated countries
- European Union: Technical Specification for Interoperability, Safety in Railway Tunnels / Stations
- Australian Standard AS-4825, Tunnel fire safety



Common Safety Method


- European Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC)
- Risk acceptance principles:
 - application of codes of practice
 - comparison with similar systems (reference systems)
 - explicit risk estimation



Risk assessment methodologies




Risk Assessment






Scenario-Based Approach





System-Based Approach






ALARP and SFAIRP

- "As Low as Reasonably Practicable" UK principle
- "So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable" Australian principle **
- Similar, but not identical principles




Frequency / Consequences Curve



Consequences [fatally injured people]



Analysis of Alternative Mitigation Measures





Test of Disproportionality

- Edwards v National Coal Board [1949]
- Australian & UK guidance: costs typically should not exceed (10 x benefits)





Fire Safety Engineering

 Fire Safety Engineering = 'The provision of fire safety by quantitative methods based on science' (UK Department of the Environment)



Prescriptive – Performance Design Continuum

Performance Design

Code Interpretation

Code Implementation

Engineering Effort




Examples of Performance-Based Fire Safety Engineering Standards

- BS 7974:2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings -Code of practice
- BS 9999:2008 Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings
- Singapore Fire Safety Engineering Guideline 2015
- Typical criterion is that full evacuation of infrastructure can be completed while tenable conditions are maintained



Singapore Fire Authority Submission Process





Equipment and vehicles



Fire Heat Rate from Trains


Determined by

- Calorific value of combustible materials (including seats, internal linings, carpets, cables etc) plus luggage and other "imported" fire loads
- Ignition source including accelerant from a possible arson attack
- Rate of fire growth affected by reactionto-fire properties of rolling stock materials



Fire Tests


- METRO project, Sweden (2012)
- Peak 77 MW fire HRR
- Stockholm Public Transport Type X1 carriage
- Built by ASEA in 1967–75, last unit taken out of service in April 2011







CFD Modelling of In-Train Fire Spread



- Fire spread triggered by radiant and convective heat flux to neighbouring surfaces
- Relies on cone calorimeter test results for reaction-to-fire properties of surfaces
- Similar to reality, can be difficult to sustain combustion – large ignition sources required



Rolling Stock Fire Standard - Europe

BS EN 45545-2:2013



BSI Standards Publication

Railway applications — Fire protection on railway vehicles

Part 2: Requirements for fire behaviour of materials and components



European Regulation

 L 356/394
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 12.12.2014

 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1303/2014

 of 18 November 2014

 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to 'safety in railway tunnels' of the rail system of the European Union

 (Text with EEA relevance)

 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

 Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community (1), and in particular Article 6(1), second subparagraph, thereof,



Underground Railway Ventilation




Tunnel Ventilation Requirements

- Smoke control (*but* consider effect of enhancing fire)
- Air quality (dilution/purging of CO, NOx and particulate matter)
- Visibility
- Temperature
- Humidity




Critical Velocity for Smoke Control



Inertia of oncoming air > Thermal buoyancy of smoke



Smoke Control in Cross-Passages



- Pressurise non-incident tube
- Airflow towards incident tube



Air Quality – CO & Visibility

TABLE 3 - DESIGN AND THRESHOLD VALUES FOR CO AND VISIBILITY/ EXTINCTION		
со	Visibility	
	Extinction coefficient K	Transmission s (beam length: 100 m)
ppm	10 ⁻³ m ⁻¹	%
70	5	60
70	7	50
100	9	40
20	3	75
200	12	30
	EXTIN CO ppm 70 70 20	EXTINCTION Visit CO Extinction coefficient K ppm 10 ⁻³ m ⁻¹ 70 5 70 7 100 9 20 3

* National workplace guidelines have to be considered

** The values given here are for tunnel operation only and not for determining ventilation capacities.



Air Quality – NO_x

- $NO_x = NO + NO_2$
- Health considerations dominated by NO₂
- World Road Association guidance: 1 ppm tunnel-average value at any one time for NO₂




Temperature

- Train congestion: keep intake temperature for air-conditioning units below 45°C
- Tunnel fit-out: keep temperature below (ambient + 10 °C)
- In fire emergency: keep temperatures low enough to ensure tenability



Station Smoke Ventilation





Smoke Purging

- Minimum of 9 air changes per hour
- Activated automatically by station fire alarm system
- Manual activation from fire command centre
- Exhaust fan to operate at 250°C for two hours



Station – Tunnel Smoke Separation






Metro Tunnel Ventilation Normal Design Criteria

To ensure A/C system can continue to operate normally:


- Normal operation: T < 40°C
- Congested operation: T < 45°C
- Online stabling start-up: T < 45°C



Train Congestion




Single Tunnel Congestion




Multiple Tunnel Congestion



Congestion - Ventilation Arrangements








Metro Tunnel Ventilation Emergency Design Criteria

8-20 MW fire heat release rate typically selected.

- Tenable environment along egress path
- Eliminate smoke back-layering (critical velocity)




Train on Fire in a Station






Train Fire in a Tunnel






Train Fire in a Tunnel (Reverse)






Train Fire, with Non-Incident Train





Train Fire in Vicinity of Cross-Over



- Critical velocity for smoke control may not be achieved.
- Tenable conditions to be maintained along escape paths and for non-incident train.



Ventilation Redundancy


- Failure of one ventilation component (e.g. fan or damper) should not lead to failure of the system
- Design check as to which component is most critical



Fire evacuation strategies



Station Evacuation





Evacuation Strategy

- Train on fire should continue travelling to the next station if possible:
 - Evacuation via open platform screen doors and out of the station via escalators, staircases and exits
 - Ventilation system to hold back smoke from entering the platform and concourse
- Alternatively:
 - Evacuation along tunnels to adjacent station
 - Ventilation to provide tenable conditions along evacuation route



Key Design Goals

- Clearance of platform: 4 minutes
- Clearance of station (or to "point of safety"): 6 minutes



Evacuation Scenarios

- Train on fire key fire scenario
- Station on fire




Evacuation Load – Train on Fire

Number of passengers to be evacuated =

- Crush-loaded train +
- Peak link load x 2 train headways +
- Train load from adjoining platform +
- Link load for one train headway Consider:
- AM and PM rush hours
- Each platform as "peak" direction
- Number of staff to be evacuated



Evacuation Capacities





Evacuation Time Calculation

- Evacuation time = Passenger load / evacuation capacity
- Sum times over all station elements (platform, escalator, staircase, ticket hall, gateline, concourse)
- Evacuation time = platform clearance time + pinch-point clearance time + free-flow walk time



Performance-Based Fire Safety Engineering

- ASET = Available safe egress time (determined by smoke movement)
- RSET = Required safe egress time (determined by evacuation routes)
- Need to ensure that ASET > RSET




Safety Factors for Performance-Based Fire Safety Engineering

Singapore Fire Safety Engineering Guideline (2015):

- Base case ≥ 2 Safety Factor (ASET/RSET)
- Sensitivity analysis ≥ 1.2 Safety Factor (ASET/RSET)



Metro Tunnel Evacuation & Fire-Fighting Access






Maximum Allowable Travel Distances (Singapore)

- Single running tunnel: 760m between exit staircases; or
- Dual running tunnels with 2-hour fire resistance between tunnels:
 - 500m between cross-passages & exit staircase or platform
 - 250m between cross-passages; 500m
 between cross-passages straddling cross-over



Maximum Allowable Travel Distances – (Singapore)





Q & A Session






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